15/05/023 al 21/05/2023
jueves, 25 de mayo de 2023
Desafíos en Seguridad Vial que salvan vida
miércoles, 24 de mayo de 2023
La Seguridad Vial: Prevención y defensa de la vida
Desafíos en Seguridad Vial que salvan vida
“Esas motos que van a mil
Solo el viento te harán sentir
Nada más, nada más…” [1]
Soy ciclista y no salgo sin mi
casco. Un pozo, un perro, una mala maniobra de un auto nos de
ja tendidos en el
suelo, por insignificante que pueda ser la caída, nuestra cabeza podría golpear
contra algo. El casco hará la diferencia y por sobre todas las cosas nos dará
la posibilidad de seguir con nuestra vida.
La Seguridad Vial es la defensa
de la vida. Las Naciones Unidas[2],
preocupada por las cifras mundiales de accidentes de tránsito que hoy
significan por día 3500 muertos y 130.000 lesionados, propuso un programa para
que los países desarrollen políticas que puedan reducir al 2030 las muertes y
lesiones a la mitad.
Este programa solicita a los
gobiernos que asuman el compromiso en mejoras de infraestructura y en planes de
educación en materia vial, e invita a la población a poner en práctica cuidados
y conductas que reduzcan los accidentes.
Experiencias en el pasado, como la
incorporación del Cinturón de Seguridad en los autos, demostraron que la
educación vial debe realizarse desde el Jardín de Infantes, porque fue una
forma efectiva que indujeron a la población a su uso. Las capacitaciones tanto
en las escuelas como en los cursos de gestión de la Licencia de Conducir permiten
que se adopten hábitos saludables y que se salven vidas. Por otra parte, la normativa debe ordenar y
orientar a los ciudadanos hacia las mejores prácticas en orden a la convivencia
ciudadana.
El uso de casco, cinturón de
seguridad y sillas para bebés buscan reducir las lesiones y muertes. El
correcto uso de estos elementos ha demostrado que cumplen con esta misión. No
es que saldrás ileso, sino que serán menores las posibilidades de una lesión
grave, reduciendo la posibilidad de muerte o la invalidez permanente.
Nunca lleves a un niño sentado
delante de ti ya que en un incidente sus lesiones serán de extremada gravedad.
¿Por qué exponerlo a ello? Si lo amas, lo protegerás. En un auto siéntalo en la
parte trasera en la silla diseñada para su edad; y en una bicicleta, con casco
siempre, y en el asiento o carro desarrollado para su transporte.
Disfruta del viaje y de tu vida. Elige cuidarte y cuidar a
quienes amas. Usa el casco.
Mayo 2023
Pablo A Bevilacqua
[1] Seminare,
Charly Garcia
[2] Resolución ONU 74/299, Plan Global para trabajar en un sobre Enfoque de la Seguridad Vial en
el decenio 2021 – 2030, con el compromiso de reducir en un 50% las muertes y
lesiones.
7ma Semana Mundial de las Naciones Unidas para la Seguridad Vial – 15/05/023 al 21/05/2023
domingo, 7 de mayo de 2023
FOUR THESES ON IDEOLOGY
* Anthony Giddens
Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory/Revue canadienne de théorie politique et sociale, Vol. 7, Nos. 1-2 (Hiver/Printemps, 1983)
(traducción Libre al castellano seguido al texto original)
disciplines of philosophy, politics and sociology. If there are such things as contested concepts, and if there were a prize for the most contested concept, the concept of ideology would very nearly rank first. Nobody can even decide how to pronounce it! Given the existence of these traditional debates and problems concerning the ideological content of ideology itself, one might think it best to throw one's hands up in despair, and discard the notion altogether. But I do not think such a reaction would be justified. I want to argue that it is possible to point to some modes of analyzing ideology that at least provide a framework for coping with the issues that the concept raises.
Along these lines, I wish to mention four
theses, and to give at least a cursory analysis of them. Briefly, I shall
claim, first, that the concept of ideology has to be separated out from the
content of science; second, that it is empty of content because what makes
belief systems ideological is their incorporation within systems of domination;
third, that to understand this incorporation we must analyze the mode in which
patterns of signification are incorporated within the medium of day-to-day
practices; finally, that we should be critical of the "dominant ideology
thesis" elaborated in different versions by such authors as Parsons, Althusser
and Habermas.
My first thesis is that the notion of ideology
has to be disconnected from the philosophy of science, with which in the past
it has almost inevitably been bound up. The term ideology was coined as a
positive term, meaning something like an all-embracing and encyclopedic form of
knowledge, capable of cutting through the resistance of prejudice to produce a
form of certain knowledge upon which social technology could in turn be founded.
As is well known, Napoleon is supposed to have reversed this perspective,
treating ideology as a derogatory appellation. Ideology became regarded as
"that which lies beyond the margins of science"-as the very
repository of prejudice and obfuscation. "Ideology", hence[1]forth,
is supposed in some way to function as a boundary condition of science. Now I
want to reject any definition of ideology as falsity, as non-science or as 'poor
science'-the concept of ideology should not be formulated by comparing or
contrasting it with the achievements of science.
In the space of these brief remarks, obviously,
I don't have time to illustrate how such connections with science have been
part of the history of the notion of ideology. Nevertheless, I take it that the
entanglements to which it leads are fairly clear. Compare, for example, the respective
views of Popper and Althusser, both of whom wish to demarcate in a clear-cut
fashion between what counts as science and what does not. Popper's prime
examples of ideologies or pseudo[1]sciences-Marxism
and psychoanalysis-are for Althusser precisely the type cases of sciences, of
forms of knowledge which have broken free from ideology. I consider this rather
comic opposition to be based upon a false starting point. I want to reject the
argument that ideology can be defined in reference to truth claims. And I also
want to reject the idea that ideology can be defined in terms of any specific
content at all. The significance of these points will, I hope, become apparent
when I move to my second argument.
My second thesis is this: the concept of ideology
should be reformulated in relation to a theory of power and domination-to the
modes in which systems of signification enter into the existence of sectional
forms of domination. This can be illustrated with reference to Marx's writings
on ideology. Marx wrote a great deal about ideology, and at the same time
hardly anything at all . A great deal of his substantive writing, including
Capital, is a critique of ideology, in the sense that it is a critique of
political economy. But if one actually searches through Marx's writings for
analyses of a concept of ideology as such-most of them appear in The German
Ideology-there are very few sources to be found where Marx sets out a
systematic exposition of the notion. In Marx one finds only various possible
formulations of what the concept of ideology means. In The German Ideology,
one can distinguish two senses in which Marx uses the term. On the one hand,
there are the famous observations, discussed by Kofman and others, about how
the ideologists write history upside down. The ideologists are accused of
writing history as seen through a camera obscura, as if it were an echo of
human consciousness. These kinds of comments occur frequently in The German
Ideology and occasionally elsewhere in Marx's writings, and they imply that the
way of demystifying history is to set it right way up again, by studying history
as it really is.
In The German Ideology, however, there is
another celebrated assertion about ideology, namely, that the ideas in any
given epoch are above all the ideas of the dominant class. According to this
proposition, the dominant class has access to notions which it can in some
sense disseminate to legitimate its own domination. This version of the theory
of ideology; connects ideology to the problem of domination. The German
ideologists are seen to write history from a point of view that serves to
sanction the existing forms of power in the societies in which they are the
intellectual leaders. Drawing upon this second Marxian strand, I therefore
propose to interpret the concept of ideology in the following way. I want to
define ideology as the mode in which forms of signification are incorporated
within systems of domination so as to sanction their continuance. I take it to be
the type case of such a notion of ideology that sectional interests are represented
as universal interests. This is the basic mode in which forms of signification
are incorporated within systems of domination in class societies. In my opinion,
this point is exemplified in Capital, where Marx tried to demonstrate that
political economy is ideological insofar as it conceals the operation of capitalism
as a class system. The political economists failed to incorporate an account of
either the historical origins of expropriated labour or of the nature of surplus
value.
My third thesis is that the analysis of
ideology must come to terms with recent developments in the philosophy of
language and action. Very briefly, these developments mark a transition from a
philosophy of language based upon the notion that language is above all a
medium of describing the world, to an interpretation of language which
emphasizes language as praxis or as the ‘other face' of action. Language is
intertwined with everyday practices. If one acknowledges the significance of
this philosophical shift, it has immediate implications, I think, for the
problem of ideology. Most traditional treatments of ideology have exaggerated
the importance of propositional belief claims as components of ideologies. This
point can be illustrated with a mundane example. Researchers visit a factory
and ask workers questions like: What do you think of the Queen? What do you
think of the Royal Wedding? Do you believe that management and workers work
together like a team? The researchers then imagine that they have uncovered key
features of ideology by virtue of their finding that there is some agreement
about the continuing importance of the role of the monarchy, etc.
Now while I do not wish to deny the possible
significance of this kind of finding, it does seem to me to be highly important
not to limit the notion of ideology to such formulations. This is because the
most subtle and interesting forms of ideology are those incorporated within
day-to-day practices. While not necessarily propositional beliefs, these forms
of ideology are very often the modes in which signification is incorporated as
part and parcel of what one does in daily life. If I may again pursue the
previously mentioned example: more important than whether or not workers agree
that they and management are a team are the ways in which modes of
signification serve to produce a daily world in which the work situation and
economic life are treated as essentially separate from political life, from
their lives as citizens. The insulation of the economic from the political I
take to be one of the major mechanisms of class domination. The most subtle
forms of ideology are buried in the modes in which concrete, day-to-day
practices are organized. If one simply treats ideology as the content of
propositional belief systems, a vast area of human action which is
ideologically relevant is excluded.
My final thesis derives from the
first three. I think it imperative to accept the broad line of argument which
writers such as Abercrombie and Turner have suggested in attacking what they
call 'the dominant ideology conception' within the social sciences. In their
view, both Left and Right have greatly exaggerated the degree to which there is
an ideological consensus among the majority of people in different classes,
both in contemporary societies and in societies prior to capitalism. They
indict Parsonian functionalism and its emphasis on the significance of a common
value system as a co-ordinating mechanism of order. But they also criticize its
left variant, the Althusserian characterization of 'ideological state
apparatuses'. To this list I would add, somewhat provocatively, Habermas'
discussion of legitimation. I think one should be as skeptical of the claim
that legitimation is a fundamental mode in which the coherence of class-dominated
societies is secured as of these other theories of consensual ideology. It is
particularly important to be cautious about the thesis that crises of legitimation
are the main sources of tension which threaten the stability of Western
capitalist societies. Such a view presumes-in company with Parsons and
Althusser-that social order rests upon normative consensus-that normative consensus,
mixed with a little police power and coercion, is the main mechanism whereby
sectional interests are held together in a class society. But there is good
reason to question just such a presumption.
King's College
Cambridge
England
FUENTE: https://journals.uvic.ca/index.php/ctheory/article/download/13949/4723
Suscribirse a:
Comentarios (Atom)